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THE SECURED TRANSACTIONS ARTICLE OF THE
COMMERCIAL CODE AND SECTION 6o OF THE
BANKRUPTCY ACT
VRN COUNMYMAN*
The secured creditor enjoys several advantages over his unsecured brethren. If
the debtor defaults on his obligation, the secured creditor is sometimes empowered
to take matters in his own hands, sell the property covered by his security, and re-
imburse himself out of the proceeds without the time and expense of the lawsuit to
which the unsecured creditor must resort. If the debtor disposes of all of his property,
the secured creditor's claim, if properly perfected, follows the property into the hands
of the transferee and may be satisfied therefrom without the necessity of litigation to
establish that the transfer was a fraudulent conveyance. If unsecured creditors go
after property of the debtor to satisfy their claims, the secured creditor's interest in
the property covered by his security, if properly perfected, is immune from their lev-
ies. And if the debtor goes into bankruptcy, the secured creditor has first claim on the
proceeds of the property covered by his security, after which he shares pro rata on
any unpaid balance with the full claims of unsecured creditors in the remainder of
the debtor's assets.
But, while the secured creditor realizes one of his greatest advantages in bank-
ruptcy proceedings, he also faces greater hazards in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy
trustee is empowered not only to set aside security transactions which other creditors
could have avoided under the doctrine of fraudulent conveyance or otherwise at
state law,' but also to avoid certain security transactions under Section 6o of the
Bankruptcy Act as "preferences"-a risk to which the secured 'transaction is not
subject outside of bankruptcy save under statutes of a few states. This risk created
by Section 6o is the Bankruptcy Act's chief hazard to secured creditors and, for the
past five years, has been the subject of their excruciating concern. That concern has
manifested itself in an energetic campaign which culminated early this year in an
amendment adding seven new paragraphs to Section 6o. Although critics of earlier
and simpler versions of this amendment labeled them unintelligible monstrosities
which "would at once have astonished and delighted Gilbert and Sullivan,"' one of
the amendment's leading proponents replies that "to anyone who reads the con-
gressional committee reports and the minutes of the hearings, its purposes will be
*B.A. 1939, LL.B. 1942, University of Washington. Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
'Bankruptcy Act §7oe. Section 67d also provides a federal equivalent of the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act which the trustee may invoke without recourse to state law.
'Moore and Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvement or Retrogression?, 57 YALS
L. J. 683, 690 (1948).
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clear and its application free from doubt."3  On another occasion, however, this
same proponent confessed that "no lawyer who has not been through the turmoil of
the last five years would be able to interpret [it]. One has to be able to understand
the background to know what [it] contains."4 Let us begin our attempt to under-
stand the amendment, therefore, with a look at both the background and the legis-
lative history.
The notion behind Section 6o is extremely simple and has remained funda-
mentally unchanged since the Bankruptcy Act was enacted in 1898. It is that an
insolvent debtor contemplating bankruptcy should not be able to defeat the bank-
ruptcy policy of equality in distribution by transferring his property to favored
creditors shortly before the bankruptcy petition is filed. Accordingly, Section 6o has
provided since 1898 that where an insolvent debtor at any time within four months
of the filing of the bankruptcy petition transfers property in payment of or as
security for an antecedent debt to a creditor who has reason to believe the debtor
insolvent, and the effect of the transfer is to enable such creditor to obtain a greater
percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class, the bankruptcy
trustee may avoid the transfer.3
Since 1898, also, a preferential transfer has been, under Section 3 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, an act of bankruptcy which would support an involuntary petition filed
within four months of the time of the transfer. And to preclude the possibility of
preferential transfers being concealed from other creditors until the time for filing
a petition had expired, Section 3b of the Act of 1898 provided that the four-month
period should not begin to run until the transfer was recorded, if by law recording
was required or permitted, or if not, until the transferee took possession of the
property, unless the petitioning creditors had notice of the transfer.0 But Section
6o had no similar "perfection clause." Hence, while an undisclosed preferential
transfer would support a petition filed more than four months after it was made, the
trustee could not set it aside in the bankruptcy proceeding.7 There remained, there-
fore, a strong incentive for concealment.
In 19o3 Congress acted to remove this incentive by adding a perfection clause to
the definition of a preference in Section 6oa, providing that the four month period
in that section should not begin to run until the transfer was recorded, "if by law
' Kupfer, The Recent Amendment of Section 6oa of the Bankruptcy Act, 24 J. N. A. RF. BANKR.
86, 87 (1950).
'Testimony of Milton P. Kupfer, Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on the
Judiciary on H. R. 272 and H. R. 6291, 81st Cong., ist Sess. 12 (1949).
"In its present form, §6o provides: "(a). A preference is a transfer . . . of any of the property
of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered
by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or against him of the
petition . . . the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of
his debt than some other creditor of the same class. . . . (b). Any such preference may be avoided
by the trustee if the creditor receiving it or to be benefited thereby . . . has, at the time when the
transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent."
639 STAr. 546-547 (1898), as amended, ii U. S. C. §2i(b) (946).
'Humphrey v. Tatman, 198 U. S. 91 (905); Rogers v. Page, 14o Fed. 596 (6th Cir. 19o5).
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such recording is required."' But a number of courts concluded that recording was
not "required" as against the bankruptcy trustee, who represented only unsecured
creditors, where state recording acts rendered unrecorded transfers invalid only as
against lien creditors and bona fide purchasers. In i9io a perfection clause which
also applied only where recording was by law "required" was added to the specifica-
tion of the trustee's invalidating power in Section 6ob, and there was also added to
Section 47(2) a "strong-arm" clause [now in Section 7oc] which gave the bankruptcy
trustee the status of a lien creditor as to all property in custody of the bank-
ruptcy court.1° But the trustee acquired the status of a lien creditor only as of the
time the petition was filed, so that where a state recording act protected only lien
creditors and/or purchasers who became such before recording, the "pocket lien"
was still good against the trustee if it was recorded at any time prior to the filing
of the petition." A 1926 amendment which made the perfection clause in Section
6oa applicable where recording was "required or permitted" but which left the
clause in Section 6ob to apply only where recording was "required"'1 was construed
by some courts so as "not in any way [to] change the rule with reference to prefer-
ences that were voidable."'l
In addition to their failure to reach all unrecorded transfers covered by state
recording laws, the perfection clauses in Section 6o also failed to reach other types of
undisclosed security devices for which no recording was prescribed. These were
so-called "equitable liens" under which the debtor remained in possession of property
which he agreed should stand charged to secure a creditor's claim, and which ripened
into "legal liens" which "related back" to the date of the original agreement when
the creditor finally took possession. By waiting more than four months to take
possession, the creditor could retain his lien against the bankruptcy trustee although
he had not asserted it until immediately before bankruptcy.14
The Chandler Act's extensive revision of the Bankruptcy Act in 1938 included
a new perfection clause for Section 6o (incorporated also in Section 3b), drafted by
832 STAT. 799 (1903), as amended, 52 STAT. 869 (1938), i U. S. C. §96 (1946).
9 In re Hunt, 139 Fed. 283 (N. D. N. Y. 1905); Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. Pipkin Drug Co., 136 Fcd.
396 (5th Cir. 19o5); In re McIntosh, 150 Fed. 546 (9th Cir. 1907), cert. denied, 207 U. S. 592 (I9o7);
In re Boyd, 213 Fed. 774 (2d Cir. 1914), cert. dismissed, 241 U. S. 689 (x916).
1036 STAT. 840, 842 (igi), as amended, Il U. S. C. §§75, 96 (1946).
" Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U. S. 268 (1915); Carey v. Donohue, 240 U. S. 430 (x916);
Martin v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 245 U. S. 513 (i918).
12 44 STAT. 666 (1926), as amended, ii U. S. C. §96 (1946).
"
3 First National Bank v. Live Stock National Bank, 31 F. 2d 416 (8th Cir. 1929); In re Cunning-
ham, 64 F. 2d 296 (4 th Cir. 1933); Hirshfeld v. Nogle, 5 F. Supp. 234 (E. D. Ill. 1933), and cases
cited.
, See Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196 U. S. 516 (1905); Sexton v. Kessler, 225 U. S. 90 (1912).
Shortly after the 1926 amendment to §6o, Professor James A. McLaughlin published an article pointing
to the inadequacies of §6o and proposing an amendment calculated to eliminate the problem of deter-
mining when recording was "required" and to strike down the "equitable lien" which, "[als applied to
some bankruptcy cases ... seems as well named as the Holy Roman Empire, for it is neither equitable nor a
lien." McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankrnptcy Act, 40 HARv. L. REv. 341, 377-391 (1927).
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Profesor McLaughlin of Harvard and designed to overcome the shortcomings of
previous perfection clauses. This one-sentence clause read as follows:
For the purposes of subdivisions a and b of this section, a transfer shall be deemed
to have been made at the time when it became so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser
from the debtor and no creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the property
so transferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein, and, if such transfer is not so
perfected prior to the filing of the petition in bankruptcy ... it shall be deemed to have
been made immediately before bankruptcy.' 5
The National Bankruptcy Conference, under whose auspices the Chandler Bill
was drafted, advised Congress that the perfection test had been "restated ... in clear,
direct, and understandable language" and that "it includes a failure to record and any
other ground which could be asserted by a bona fide purchaser or a creditor of the
transferor, as against the transferee.... The purpose of the test is to strike down
secret transfers, and thus the transfer is to be deemed made when it becomes known
and not when it was actually made."' 6 Professor McLaughlin told a House Com-
mittee that under the new perfection clause "a transfer is not regarded made until it
is so far perfected as to be good as against a bona fide purchaser."''
The meaning of the new perfection clause came before the Supreme Court in
x943 in the Klauder case.' s That case arose in Pennsylvania and involved loans made
to a debtor and secured by contemporaneous assignments of accounts receivable.
At common law, the effect of such assignments as against a subsequent assignee of
the same accounts was governed by one of three rules applicable to assignments of
contract rights generally: (i) The "English rule," whereby a subsequent assignee
who first notified the account obligor of his assignment would prevail:over the prior
assignee. 9 (2) The "Massachusetts" or "four horsemen" rule, embodied in the
Restatement of Contracts, whereby the first assignee prevails unless a subsequent
assignee is first to obtain a judgment on the account, or payment of it, or a novation
with the obligor, or possession of a document whose surrender is required to enforce
the obligation." (3) The "New York rule," whereby the first assignee, being prior
in time, is also "prior in right" regardless of his own inaction or of any action taken
by a subsequent assignee." At the time Klauder arose, Pennsylvania followed the
1G 52 STAT. 869-870 (1938), as amended, ii U. S. C. §96a (946).
" ANALYSIS OF H. R. 12889, HOUSE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE PRINT, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. I88 (1936).
The Chandler Bill died in Committee in the 7 4th Congress and was reintroduced as H. R. 6439, 75th
Cong., ist Sess. (1937) and, in revised form but with no change in §6o, as H. R. 8046, 75th Cong.,
ist Sess. (1937), in which form it was finally passed in 1938.
"'Hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on H. R. 6439 and H. R. 8046, 7 5 th Cong., ist
Sess. 123 (1937). See also McLaughlin, Aspects of the Chandler Bill to Amend the Bankruptcy Act,
4 U. OF CHs. L. REv. 369, 392-394 (1937).
"
8 Corn Exchange National Bank v. Klauder, 318 U. S. 434 (1943).
' Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. I, 38 Eng. Rep. 475 (Ch. 1828).
R ESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §173 (1932).
2'Fortunato v. Patten, 147 N. Y. 277, 41 N. E. 572 (1895); Central Trust Co. v. West India Imp.
Co., 169 N. Y. 314, 62 N. E. 387 (19oi); Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum, 214 App. Div. 525,
208 N. Y. Supp. 944 (1st Dep't 1925); State Factors Corp. v. Sales Factors Corp., 257 App. Div. 1o,
12 N. Y. S. 2d x2 (xst Dep't 1939).
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"English rule" and the assignees in Klauder had not given notice of their assign-
ments to the account obligors.
Since the bankruptcy petition in Klauder was filed three months after the assign-
ments were made, it was not necessary to resort to the perfection clause to bring the
transactions within the four-month period of Section 6o. But there was another
problem. Transfers given to secure contemporaneous advances-as were the assign-
ments in Klauder-are not within Section 6D, which applies only to transfers to
creditors "for or on account of an antecedent debt."22 It was the bankruptcy trustee's
contention, however, that since under Pennsylvania law these assignments were
never "so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser" (ie., a hypothetical subsequent
assignee who first gave notice) could thereafter have acquired rights superior to the
assignees, they must under the perfection clause "be deemed to have been made
immediately before bankruptcy." So treated, they were made subsequent to the
time of the loans, and became transfers "on account of an antecedent debt." The
Supreme Court accepted this contention as a correct application not only of "a literal
reading of the Act," but also of a reading of the Act in the light of a history which
revealed that "for thirty-five years Congress has consistently reached out to strike
down secret transfers, and the courts have with equal consistency found its efforts
faulty or insufficient to that end."
Shortly after Klauder was decided, a District Court in the Vardainan case2
reached the same result in dealing with an assignment of accounts receivable under
the "Massachusetts rule," on the theory that a hypothetical subsequent assignee
could prevail over the first assignee by taking one of the four steps contemplated by
that rule, although there was nothing the first assignee could do to perfect his
assignment against such an eventuality. Later, the Third Circuit in the similar case
of Rosen24 rejected this interpretation of the perfection clause of Section 6o because
"the favored position acquired by the subsequent assignee [under the "Massachusetts
rule"] ... comes not from his status as a bona fide purchaser, but from his activities
following his belated assignment."
The decision in Klauder, at least, was not surprising. Although the 19o3 perfection
clause in Section 6o provided only that the four month period should be computed
from the date of perfection, bankruptcy trustees had argued under that clause that a
transfer for a contemporaneous loan, where recording was required, was converted
into a transfer for an antecedent debt by delay in recording, and in at least one
instance a bankruptcy court had agreed 2 5 The Klauder interpretation of the
Chandler Act's express statement that the transfer should be "deemed to have been
" See note 5 supra.
"I1n re Vardaman Shoe CO., 52 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Mo. 1943).
2 I1n re Rosen, 157 F. 2d 997 (3 d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U. S. 835 (1947).
15In re Mission Fixture and Mantel Co., i8o Fed. 263 (W. D. Wash. 19io). Contra: In re Jackson
Brick & Tile Co., 289 Fed. 636 (D. Mo. 1911), rev'd on other grounds, 195 Fed. 188 (8th Cir. 1912);
Claridge v. Evans, 137 Wis. 218, 118 N. W. x98 (29o8), rehearing denied, zi8 N. W. 803 (19o8).
See also Brigman v. Covington, 219 Fed. 500 (4 th Cir. 1915), decided under the igio perfection clause.
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made" when perfected had been anticipated2 6 An attempt to obviate that result by
another amendment to Section 6o had failed, 7 and a campaign for state legislation
had yielded, before Klauder was decided, one statute protecting an assignee of
accounts receivable whose assignment was preceded or accompanied by the filing of a
notice of the debtor's intention to assign his accounts, 28 and two statutes protecting
an assignee whose assignment was noted on the debtor's books of account.29
Since the Klauder decision, this campaign has gone forward with great success.
By August, 1949, fifteen states had notice-filing statutes,30 three had bookmarking
statutes,31 and fifteen had "validation" statutes adopting the "New York rule."'32
Of the fifteen states without statutes, the courts of Mississippi and Tennessee are
committed to the "English rule" involved in the Klauder case,33 the courts of New
York adhere to the "New York rule"34 and appear to be joined by the courts of five
"' Hamilton, The Effect of Section Sixty of the Bankruptcy Act Upon Assignments of Accounts
Receivable, 26 VA. L. REv. i68 (939); Neuhoff, Assignment of Accounts Receivable as Affected by the
Chandler Act, 34 ILL. L. REV. 538 (1940); Mulder, Ambiguities in the Chandler Act, 89 U. oF PA. L.
REV. 10, 2526 (1940); 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 9IO-936, 962-972 ( 4 th ed. 194). Professor Mc-
Laughlin, draftsman of this section of the Chandler Act, had also anticipated the possibility of the
Klauder interpretation, but had dismissed it because the term "bona fide purchaser" as used in the
Chandler Act "is commonly, though not necessarily, used to designate a person who makes a bona fide
purchase and does nothing more." Therefore, he thought it would not be construed to include a hypo-
thetical subsequent assignee who not only purchased an account, but also notified the account obligor
of his purchase. McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 6o HA. L. REv. 233, 246-249
(1946). Professor Hanna had also urged this interpretation of §6o before the Klauder case reached the
Supreme Court. Hanna, Some Unsolved Problems Under Section 6oA of the Bankruptcy Act, 43 COL.
L. REv. 58 (943).
" S. 3554, 7 6th Cong., 3d Sess. (940), which was introduced by Senator Davis of Pennsylvania and
which died in Committee, would have amended §6o to provide that, "in the case of accounts receivable,
choses in action, and other intangibles, a transfer shall be deemed to have been perfected within the
meaning of this Act when it has been fully consummated between the debtor and his transferee."
28 Omo GEN. CODE ANN. §§85o9-3 to 8509-6 (Supp. 1949).
"sPA. STAT. ANN. c. 5, §§561 to 563 (Supp. 1949); GA. CODE ANN. §55-1803 (Supp. 1949).
"
0 in addition to the Ohio statute cited in note 28 supra: Ala. Acts 1949, No. 338; CAL. Cv. CODE
§§3017 to 3029 (1949); COLO. STAT. ANN. C. 12A, §§i to 1[7 (Supp. 3949); FLA. STAr. ANN. §§524.0
to 524.o6 (Supp. 1949); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§64-901 to 64-907 (3948); Kan. Laws 1949, C. i32; Mo.
Ruv. STAT. ANN. §§3347-1 to 3347.6 (Supp. 1949); NEB. REV. STAT. §§69-9O3 to 69-923 (Supp. 3949);
N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§44-77 to 44-85 (Supp. 1949); OKuA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, 9§633 to 637 (Supp.
1949); S. C. CODE ANN. §398 (Supp. 3946); Tx. REv. Crv. STAT. art. 26o-I (947); UTAH CODE ANN.
§§8iB-o-3 to 81B-o-7 (Supp. 3949); WASH. REV. STAT. §§2721-8 to 2721-12 (Supp. 1947).
"in addition to the Georgia and Pennsylvania statutes cited in note 29 supra: N. D. REv. CODE
§29-108 to 29-3109 (Supp. 1949).
"
2 AnK. STAT. ANN. §68-8o5 (3947); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§6718 to 6726 (949); ILL. STAT. ANN.
C. 121 1/2, §§22o to 222 (Supp. 3949); IND. STAT. ANN. §§g-2Io1 to 19-2 04 (3950); Me. Laws
1945, c. oo; 1&. CODE ANN. art. 8, §Ia (Supp. I947); MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 07A, §§z to 6 (1947);
MICH. STAT. ANN. §§99.841 to 39.849 (Supp. 3949); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§521.O1 to 521.07 (3947);
N. H. Laws 1945, c. 39; ORE. Comp. LAws §62a-Ioi (Supp-. 3949); R. I. Laws 1945, C. 1345; S. D.
Laws 3949, C. 233; VA. CODE ANN. §§11-5 to 11-7 (1950); Wis. STAT. §241.28 (3949).
" Canton Exchange Bank v. Yazoo County, 3E44 Miss. 579, 309 So. 1 (3926); Peters v. Goetz, 336
Tenn. 257, 188 S. W. 3344 (1916).
=" See McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 266 App. Div. 599, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 551 (ist Dep't 1943), aff'd
on other grounds, 292 N. Y. 347, 55 N. E. 2d 392 (1944), aff'd, 323 U. S. 365 (1945)-
82 LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
other states,35 while no rule seems to be established in Arizona, Delaware, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Vermont,30 and Wyoming.
This record of accomplishment in the state legislatures in no way abated the
clamor for amendment of Section 6o, which the representatives of secured lenders
had set up after the K'auder decision. In 1945 the American Bar Association
established a special committee on the revision of Section 6o consisting of Homer
J. Levingston, Vice-President of the First National Bank of Chicago, Milton P.
Kupfer, counsel for the National Conference of Commercial Receivables Companies,
Inc., J. Francis Ireton, counsel for Commercial Credit Company, a national sales
financing organization, Professor John Hanna of Columbia Law School, and Pro-
fessor McLaughlin of Harvard.8 7 By the latter part of 1946 this Committee, with
Professor Hanna as chief draftsman, had evolved a bill to amend Section 6o.
In a series of articles published by members of the A. B. A. committee in support
of their bill, the interpretation of Section 6o in the Klauder and Vardaman decisions
was invariably cited as demonstrating the need for amendment. But, save as these
decisions evidenced a judicial tendency to give a "literal interpretation" to Section 6o,
they had little to do with what the advocates of amendment were worried about.
Understandably, they were no longer concerned about the fate of assignments of
accounts receivable under Section 6o. Their alarm was now focused on three other
horrible possibilities. 8
.First, under a variety of inventory financing devices-principally trust receipts,
conditional sales for resale, factors' liens,3" and chattel mortgages on a shifting stock
" Ottumwa Boiler Works v. O'Meara, 2o6 Iowa 577, 218 N. W. 920 (1928); Columbia Finance &
Trust Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 116 Ky. 364, 76 S. W. 156 (1903); General Electric Co. v. Black, x9 Mont.
11o, 47 Pac. 639 (897); Moorestown Trust Co. v. Buzby, iog N. J. Eq. 409, 157 Ad. 663 (193x);
Tingle v. Fisher, 2o W. Va. 297 (1882). None of these courts has yet considered whether a subsequent
assignee would be allowed to prevail under any or all of the four exceptions recognized in the "Massachu-
setts rule."
"
8 In Ormsby & Farnham v. Fifield, 38 Vt. 143 (1865), the Vermont court applied the New York
rule, but dictum in a later case states that, "The rule is that the assignment of a chose in action is not
complete so as to vest the tide as against the debtor, subsequent assignees, and attacking creditors, until
notice thereof has been given to the debtor." Goodwin v. Barre Say. Bank & Trust Co., 91 Vt. 228, 1oo
Atl. 34 (1917).
" Professor McLaughlin became a member of the committee in 1946, replacing W. Leslie Miller of
the Detroit bar.
"s Kupfer, Progress in the Amendment of Section 6oa of the Bankruptcy Act, x3 LAw & CorMtp.
PROB. 624 (948); Hanna, Preferences in Bankruptcy, x5 U. oF Cts. L. REv. 311 (1948); Ireton, A
Proposal to Amend §6oa of the Bankruptcy Act, A6, Coay. RaoRo. & Am. BANxR. REV. 257, 287 (1947);
McLaughlin, Defining a Preference in Bankruptcy, 6o HAxv. L. REV. 233 (1946); Kupfer and Livingston,
Corn Exchange National Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder Revisited: The Aftermath of Its Implications, 32
VA. L. REV. 9i (1946), 33 VA. L. REv. 1 (1947). [Irvin I. Livingston, co-author of the last cited article,
was not a member of the A. B. A. Committee. He is counsel for the Midwest Conference of Accounts
Receivable Companies.] See also, Livingston and Kearns, Commercial Financing and the Relation be-
tween Secured and Unsecured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 13 LAw & CONTEMIP. PRon. 609 (a948) [Mr.
Kearns is counsel for the First National Bank of Chicago].
" It is arguable that in the ordinary transaction involving a trust receipt or a conditional sale there is no
"transfer" from the debtor to the conditional vendor within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, hence no
possibility of invalidation under §6o. Bailey v. Baker Ice Machine Co., 239 U. S. 268 (i9i5), held that a
conditional sale to the debtor did not constitute such a transfer, but the definition of "transfer" [now con-
tained in § 1(30) of the Bankruptcy Act] has since been amended to include "every ... mode.., of fixing
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of goods-the borrower is empowered to sell from stock in ordinary course of trade
and the purchaser in ordinary course takes tide which is good against the secured
lender. Under a "literal interpretation" of Section 6o, such a security device could
never be "so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser from the debtor .. .could
thereafter have acquired any rights in the property so transferred superior to the
rights of the transferee therein. 40 Second, there was the matter of security devices
which by state law are required to be recorded before they are good against bona
fide purchasers and/or creditors. Since it is not practicable to close all loans on the
courthouse steps, there must invariably be some delay between the time of the loan
and the time of recording the security. Under a "literal interpretation" of Section
6o all such transfers of security would be "deemed to have been made" at the time
of recording, and would thus become transfers for antecedent debts because of un-
avoidable delay in recording. Third, there are certain types of liens which are by
statute given priority over other liens.4' Under a "literal interpretation" of Section
6o, no security device could ever be so far perfected that a creditor acquiring one of
these liens with statutory priority could not acquire rights in the debtor's property
superior to those of the creditor with the secured claim 42
The A.B.A. bill to eliminate these possibilities was introduced in Congress in
1947 and was kept continuously before Congress for three years thereafter.4 3 But
Professor McLaughlin found himself in disagreement with the other members of the
a lien upon property, or upon an interest therein." 52 STAT. 842 (1938). Professor Hanna has suggested
at various times and with various degrees of conviction that conditional sales are not "transfers" and that
trust receipts and factors' liens are "statutory liens" within the meaning of §67b and exempted thereby from
the application of §6o. Hanna, Some Unsolved Problems Under Section 6oA of the Bankruptcy Act,
43 COL. L R v. 58, 67"69 (1943); Hanna, Foreword to Koessler, Assignment of Accounts Receivable,
33 CALIF. L. REv. 40, 44 (1945); Hanna, Preferences in Bankruptcy, 15 U. OF CHi. L. Ray. 311, 317-320
(1948); Hanna, Preference as Affected by Section 6oc and Section 67b of the Bankruptcy Law, 25 WAsH.
L. REv. 1, 12-15 (950).
" Such an interpretation of §6oa was rejected by Referee Paul R. Kach in an opinion approving a
compromise between a trust receipt holder and the trustee in bankruptcy. In re Wallace, Bkcy No. 9974
(D. Md. 1948). Referee Kach thought that "any possible application of Section 6oa is avoided ...in
this case by two principal considerations, viz.: (i) The existence of a valid recording [pursuant to the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act] of which all persons are charged with notice, giving warning of the
possible presence of merchandise not owned by the [debtor), however free his premises might be of
physical evidence of such ownership and even though he be making continued sales therefrom .... (2)
The clearly disclosed legislative intent of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act is to give those persons who
comply therewith priority against all but an actual bona fide purchaser. These two purposes are accom-
plished-and can only be accomplished-by according [the entruster] priority over a subsequent bank-
ruptcy trustee of [the debtor]."
"E.g., the priority lien given to persons injured by automobiles under S. C. Cone ANN. §8792 (1942).
" Three students of this problem were so titillated by this parade of horribles that they concluded
that the "logical implications" of the Klauder decision foreshadowed the probability of headlines in the
Wall Street Journal proclaiming: "Supreme Court Voids All Security Devices as Bankruptcy Preferences."
Keeffe, Kelly and Lewis, Sick Sixty: A Proposed Revision of Section 6oa of the Bankruptcy Act, 33
CORN. L. Q. 99 (1947). Others were not similarly impressed. See Oglebay, Proposed Revision of Section
6oa of the Bankruptcy Act: Step Backward, 51 Cor. L. J. 263 (1946); Martin, Substantive Regulation
of Security Devices Under the Bankruptcy Power, 48 COL. L. REv. 62 (948); Moore and Tone, Proposed
Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvement or Retrogression?, 57 YAaE L. 1. 683 (1948); Comment, 57 YALE
L. J. 828 (1948).
" H. R. 2412 and S. 826, 8oth Cong., ist Sess. (1947); H. R. 272 and S. 88, 81st Cong., ist Sess.
(1949)-
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A.BA. committee on one point-he wanted to add to the Bankruptcy Act a provision
that an assignment of accounts receivable would not be valid against the bankruptcy
trustee unless notice of the assignment was filed in the office of the clerk of the
appropriate federal judicial district or unless an applicable state notice-filing statute
had been complied with. Accordingly, he drafted a bill which incorporated this re-
quirement, in addition to the amendment of Section 6o, and this bill was endorsed by
the National Bankruptcy Conference and introduced in Congress shortly after intro-
duction of the A.B.A. bill.44
Hearings were held on these competing bills in 1948 and again in 1949.45 In
these hearings, proponents of amendment of Section 6o did not attempt to lead the
members of the Congressional Committee through the intricacies of their fears about
security transactions whose recording was unavoidably delayed40 or about the threat
of liens with special statutory priority-they concentrated on the argument that
Section 6o would invalidate all known forms of inventory financing.47 The A.B.A.
bill was supported and Professor MacLachlan's4 s filing provision for assignments
of accounts receivable was opposed by the American Finance Conference, repre-
senting some 350 sales finance companies,40 the National Conference of Commercial
Receivable Companies, Inc., ° the American Bankers Association,5 ' the Midwest
Conference of Accounts Receivable Companies,52 the New York Factors' Legisla-
tive Committee,5" several state associations of bankers and finance companies, and
various individual banks and finance companies. The National Association of
Credit Men, representing mostly unsecured creditors, approved the proposed amend-
ment to Section 6o on condition that it be accompanied by passage of a federal filing
"H. R. 5834, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H. R. 2691, 81st Cong., ist Sess. (1949).
"' Hearings before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 2412 and H. R.
5834, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess. (1948) (hereinafter cited as 1948 Hearings); Hearings before a Subcommittee
of the House Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 272 and H. R. 2691, 8ist Cong., ist Scss. (1949)
(hereinafter cited as 1949 Hearings). The record of 1948 hearings before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 826 has not been printed.
"There is a brief reference to this problem in a written statement submitted by the American Bar
Association. 1948 Hearings, supra, at x6.
' Some apprehension about other federal courts following the Vardaman decision on assignment of
accounts receivable under the "Massachusetts rule" was also expressed, although by this time every
state following that rule as to assignment of contract rights generally had adopted a statute prescribing
a different rule for assignment of accounts receivable. Thus a written statement submitted by the A. B. A.,
after discussing Vardaman, concludes that "there is always the hazard of similar holdings as long as
section 6oa remains in its present form" (1948 Hearings, supra, at 17); a statement submitted by Benja-
min Wham, Chairman of the ABA Section of Corporation, Banking and Mercantile Law, notes that a
view contrary to Vardaman was taken in the Rosen case, but states "there are eight judicial circuits
still to be heard from" (948 Hearings, supra, at 148); and Milton P. Kupfer testified about "this conflict
of authority between two circuits with 8 out of the io circuits still to be heard from" (949 Hearings,
supra, at II).
"'In 1948 Professor McLaughlin became Professor MacLachlan by order of a Massachusetts court,
"correcting an error made in Scotland about 1835." 2 HANNA AND MAcLACHLAN, CASES oN CREDITORS'
RI;GHTs viii n. 2 (4 th ed. 1948).
41 1948 Hearings, supra note 45, at 22, 68-71; 1949 Hearings, supra note 45, at 39-41, 154-155.
ro 1948 Hearings, supra note 45, at 22, 34.
"1948 Hearings, supra note 45, at 81, 15O; 1949 Hearings, supra note 45, at 132.
1 948 Hearings, supra, at ix6-i21.
53 1948 Hearings, supra, at 1o3-1o9; 1949 Hearings, supra, at 61-70.
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requirement for assignments of accounts receivable.54 The Commercial Law League,
also representing unsecured creditors, opposed both the A. B. A. bill and the Bank-
ruptcy Conference bil155-- its spokesman at the 1948 hearings proposed that, if amend-
ment of Section 6o be deemed necessary to protect inventory financing arrangements
and security devices whose recording was delayed, it could be accomplished by
addition of a two-sentence proviso to Section 6oa. 6 Borrowers were not represented
in the hearings, but a number of the witnesses who appeared before the Committee
testified that their chief concern about the threat to inventory financing arrangements
posed by Section 6o was that it tended to clog the type of financing most commonly
employed by small businessmen.
7
The A. B. A. bill passed the Senate twice,"s but the House Committee substituted
a compromise bill59 which was essentially the bill drafted by Professor MacLachlan
54 1948 Hearings, supra, at 47, 71-75, 97-103; 1949 Hearings, supra, at 83-98, 136.
1= 948 Hearings, supra, at 61-68; 1949 Hearings, supra, at 129-131.
o "Provided, however, That whereby or under the terms of a transfer the creditor retains or reserves
title to the property transferred, or obtains a security interest therein, and the debtor is given or retains
possesssion of the property with power to sell the same in the ordinary course of his business, such
transfer, if valid under applicable Federal or State law against all persons except a bona fide purchaser
in the ordinary course of business and if made for or on account of a new and contemporaneous con-
sideration shall, to the extent of such consideration, be deemed to have been made at the time when
it was actually made: And provided further, That where a transfer is required to be recorded by Federal
or State law and is so recorded within the period fixed in such law, or within 30 days after the transfer
was actually made, whichever first expires, or, if no period is fixed in such law, within 30 days after
the transfer was actually made, then, in any such case, the transfer shall be deemed to have been made
at the time when it was actually made." Statement of Jacob I. Weinstein, 1948 Hearings, supra, at 68.
In the 1949 hearings, additional proposals for brief amendments to §6o to eliminate fears about
inventory financing arrangements and the threat of liens with statutory priority were proffered:
"For the purposes of subdivisions a and b of this section, a transfer shall be deemed to have been
made at the time when it became so far perfected, wherever the nature of the transfer permits, that no
bona fide purchaser from the debtor and no creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights in the
property so transferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein .. " Statement of Professor James
W. Moore, Yale University, 1949 Hearings, supra, at 124.
"For the purposes of subdivisions a and b of this section, a transfer shall be deemed to have been
made at the time when it became so far perfected that no bona fide purchaser from the debtor and no
creditor against whom the transfer could have been perfected could thereafter have acquired any
rights...." Statement of Vern Countryman, 1949 Hearings, supra, at 134.
"" Testimony of John V. Kearns, counsel for First National Bank of Chicago, 1948 Hearings, supra,
at 53-54, 1949 Hearings, supra, at 79; testimony of Professor John Hanna, 1948 Hearings, supra, at 125;
testimony of Clarence 0. Holten, counsel for Minnesota Association of Sales Finance Companies, 1948
Hearings, supra, at 77, 1949 Hearings, supra, at 41-42; testimony of Thomas W. Rogers, Executive Vice-
President, American Finance Conference, 1948 Hearings, supra, at 71, 1949 Hearings, supra, at 40.
Similar concern was expressed in statements submitted by the American Bar Association, 1948 Hearings,
supra, at 16, 1949 Hearings, supra, at 142.
" S. 826 passed the Senate in 1948. 94 CONG. REC. 7708 (948). S. 88 passed the Senate in 1949.
95 Cong. Rec. 10419 (July 26, 1949). Committee reports on both bills informed the Senate that "the
present language of the Act tends to impede and choke the flow of credit, principally to small business
men, at a time when it should be promoted." The reports also advised that, "Although the Third
Circuit... in the later case of... Rosen ... expresses its disagreement with the theory of the Vardaman
case, the law thus remains in conflict, and there are eight judicial circuits out of the ten which have
not ruled on this question." S. RE. No. 1514, 8oth Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (948); S. RaP. No. 72, 8ist
Cong., ist Sess. 1-3 (i949).
9 H. R. 5933, 8ist Cong., Ist Sess. (1949). The House Committee also reported that "The present
language of the Act tends to impede and choke the flow of credit, principally to small business men," and
that after the Vardaman and Rosen decisions the law on assignments of accounts receivable "remains in
conflict, and there are eight judicial circuits out of the ten which have not ruled on this question." H..R.
RaP. No. 1293, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 4-5 (1949).
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for the National Bankruptcy Conference with the filing requirement for assignments
of accounts omitted6 °
At this propitious stage of Congressional proceedings, the proponents of amend-
ment of Section 6o acquired some support for their alarm about the future of in-
ventory financing. A Referee in Bankruptcy held that a factor's lien, under which
the lienor was empowered to sell to purchasers in ordinary course of trade, was
imperfectible under Section 6o and therefore a transfer for an antecedent debt,"' and
a federal district court in the Harvey case reached the same conclusion about a trust
receipt.02  Shortly thereafter the compromise bill passed the House.0 3  After the
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee had called the Senate's attention to the
Harvey decision, the Senate accepted the House substitute64 and the compromise bill
became Public Law 46.05
Mr. Walter D. Malcolm, counsel for the First National Bank of Boston, testified
in support of the Bankruptcy Conference bill with the federal filing requirement
deleted, but admitted that he encountered some difficulty in determining how one
paragraph [now paragraph (6) of Section 6oa] affected the provisions of a previous
paragraph [now paragraph (2) of Section 6oa]: "I am free to confess that in this
type of problem, I can go so far in a reasoning process, and then I reach what appears
to be a completely blank wall. My mind will not bear it any further, and I cannot
analyze what will happen in this situation, and I am not sure what is going to happen
now.
66
" Professor MacLachlan testified before the House Committee that it would be better to have the
amendment of §6o without a filing requirement than to have no amendment at all. 1949 Hearings, supra,
hotc 45, at 56, 6o. This position was later endorsed by a majority of the National Bankruptcy Confer-
ence. See MacLachlan, Preference Redefined, 63 HAuv. L. RaV. 1390, 1396 (i95o).
" Decisions of Referee Paul R. Kach in In re Baltimore Casting Corp., Bkcy No. 10,004 (D. Md.
1949) and In re Liberty Motors and Engineering Corp., Bkcy No. io,o2 (D. Md. 1949). In both of
these cases the factor's lien agreements were recorded as required by the Maryland Factor's Lien Act.
In each case Referee Kach noted that his opinion in In re Wallace, supra, note 40, "stated more fully
some of the contentions that can be made against [the) decision in this case."
"In re Harvey Distributing Co., 88 F. Supp. 466 (E. D. Va. I95O). On appeal from this decision,
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit vacated the District Court's order and remanded the case
for consideration of the applicability of the 195o amendment to §6o. On October 26, 195o, the District
Court concluded that the i95o amendment was inapplicable. Letter from John 0. Herrman, counsel for
the trustee in bankruptcy, Nov. 3, 1950.
6396 Cong. Rec. 1510 (Feb. 6, I95O).
64 96 Cong. Rec. 2693 (Mar. 7, 1950).
"Pub. Law 461, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
so 1949 Hearings, supra note 45, at 116. Compare the statement of Alfred Heuston, counsel for
Bankers Trust Company and The New York Trust Company: "People say, 'What arc you fellows doing?
You are making it so hard that every time I have to look in section 6o of the Bankruptcy Act, it will
take me 2 days to figure out what this language means. . . .' But I think there is nothing for you to
do now except to follow this terribly complicated thing that we have and go ahead with it .... If H. R.
272 or . . . H. R. 2691 is to be adopted, great care should be taken in writing the committee report,
because the bills are made up of combinations of exceedingly complicated and difficult provisions which
the average practitioner, who rarely has to consider section 6o problems, will have to struggle over
prayerfully. He should have all the help which a report can give him in his hours of travail." 1949
Hearings, supra, at 7, 78. No such committee report as Mr. Heuston had in mind was ever submitted.
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I am equally free to confess to a similar reaction. But mine is not confined to any
two of the paragraphs added to Section 6oa by Public Law 461. In defense of Mr.
Malcolm and of myself, let me set out the new Section 6oa in full:
a. (i) A preference is a transfer, as defined in this Act, of any of the property of a
debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or
suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or
against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, the effect of which
transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some
other creditor of the same class.
(2) For the purposes of subdivisions a and b of this section, a transfer of property
other than real property shall be deemed to have been made or suffered at the time when
it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal
or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the rights of the
transferee. A transfer of real property shall be deemed to have been made or suffered
when it became so far perfected that no subsequent bona fide purchase from the debtor
could create rights in such property superior to the rights of the transferee. If any transfer
of real property is not so perfected against a bona fide purchase, or if any transfer of other
property is not so perfected against such liens by legal or equitable proceedings prior to the
filing of a petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, it shall be deemed to have been
made immediately before the filing of the petition.
(3) The provisions of paragraph (2) shall apply whether or not there are or were
creditors who might have obtained such liens upon the property other than real property
transferred and whether or not there are or were persons who might have become bona
fide purchasers of such real property.
(4) A lien obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings upon a simple contract within
the meaning of paragraph (2) is a lien arising in ordinary course of such proceedings upon
the entry or docketing of a judgment or decree, or upon attachment, garnishment, execu-
tion, or like process, whether before, upon, or after judgment or decree and whether before
or upon levy. It does not include liens which under applicable law are given a special
priority over other liens which are prior in time.
(5) A lien obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings could become superior to the
rights of a transferee or a purchase could create rights superior to the rights of a transferee
within the meaning of paragraph (2), if such consequences would follow only from the
lien or purchase itself, or from such lien or purchase followed by any step wholly within
the control of the respective lien holder or purchaser, with or without the aid of ministerial
action by public officials. Such a lien could not, however, become so superior and such a
purchase could not create such superior rights for the purposes of paragraph (2) through
any acts subsequent to the obtaining of such a lien or subsequent to such a.purchase which
require the agreement or concurrence of any third party or which require any further
judicial action, or ruling.
(6) The recognition of equitable liens where available means of perfecting legal liens
have not been employed is hereby declared to be contrary to the policy of this section.
If a transfer is for security and if (A) applicable law requires a signed and delivered
writing, or a delivery of possession, or a filing or recording, or other like overt action as a
condition to its full validity against third persons other than a buyer in the ordinary course
of trade claiming through or under the transferor and (B) such overt action has not been
taken, and (C) such transfer results in the acquisition of only an equitable lien, then
such transfer is not perfected within the meaning of paragraph (2). Notwithstanding the
first sentence of paragraph (2), it shall not suffice to perfect a transfer which creates an
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equitable lien such as is described in the first sentence of paragraph (6), that it is made
for a valuable consideration and that both parties intend to perfect it and that they take
action sufficient to effect a transfer as against liens by legal or equitable proceedings on a
simple contract: Provided, however, That where the debtor's own interest is only equitable,
he can perfect a transfer thereof by any means appropriate fully to transfer an interest of
that character: And provided further, That nothing in paragraph (6) shall be construed
to be contrary to the provisions of paragraph (7).
(7) Any provisions of this subdivision a to the contrary notwithstanding if the ap-
plicable law requires a transfer of property other than real property for or on account of a
new and contemporaneous consideration to be perfected by recording, delivery, or other-
wise, in order that no lien described in paragraph (2) could become superior to the rights
of the transferee therein, or if the applicable law requires a transfer of real property for
such a consideration to be so perfected in order that no bona fide purchase from the debtor
could create rights in such property superior to the rights of the transferee, the time of
transfer shall be determined by the following rules:
I. Where (A) the applicable law specifies a stated period of time of not more
than twenty-one days after the transfer within which recording, delivery, or some
other act is required, and compliance therewith is had within such stated period
of time; or where (B) the applicable law specifies no such stated period of time
or where such stated period of time is more than twenty-one days, and compliance
therewith is had within twenty-one days after the transfer, the transfer shall be
deemed to be made or suffered at the time of the transfer.
II. Where compliance with the law applicable to the transfer is not had in accord-
ance with the provisions of subparagraph I, the transfer shall be deemed to be
made or suffered at the time of compliance therewith, and if such compliance is
not had prior to the filing of the petition initiating a proceeding under this Act,
such transfer shall be deemed to have been made or suffered immediately before
the filing of such petition.
(8) If no such requirement of applicable law specified in paragraph (7) exists, a
transfer wholly or in part, for or on account of a new and contemporaneous consideration
shall, to the extent of such consideration and interest thereon and the other obligations
of the transferor connected therewith, be deemed to be made or suffered at the time of the
transfer. A transfer to secure a future loan, if such a loan is actually made, or a transfer
which becomes security for a future loan, shall have the same effect as a transfer for or on
account of a new and contemporaneous consideration. 7
This is indeed a wondrously complicated way of saying that transfers which are
not made for or on account of antecedent debts shall not be treated as if they were
so made simply because of unavoidable delay in recording or because a subsequent
purchaser in ordinary course of trade or lien creditor with special statutory priority
" Public Law 461 does not alter the Chandler Act perfection clause in §3b; once again there may be
some preferential transfers which constitute acts of bankruptcy but which cannot be avoided by the
bankruptcy trustee. Public Law 461 does amend the "strong-arm" clause of §7oc, which formerly gave
the bankruptcy trustee the status of a lien creditor as to all property of the bankrupt in the custody of
the bankruptcy court, so that the trustee now enjoys this status as to all property of the bankrupt "whether
or not coming into the possession or control of the court." The Bankruptcy Conference, whose bill
initiated this amendment, explained that in view of the lien creditor test set up by the amendment
to §6o, this amendment to §7oc merely effected a "conforming change." 1948 Hearings, stupra,
at 49. But third parties who deal in good faith with property of the bankrupt which is not in the
possession or control of the court may discover that the amendment does more than that.
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would prevail over the transferee.68 But, despite its fearsome proportions, Mr.
Malcolm and I and others interested in bankruptcy must try to fathom this new
Section 6o. More specifically, for the purposes of this symposium, I must attempt
to fathom Section 6o as it will apply to security transactions as governed by the
proposed Uniform Commercial Code.69
And the Secured Transactions Article of the Code is no model of simplicity
either. It sets out a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security interests
created by contract in personal property. Its requirements are based, not upon the
particular security device involved, but upon the nature of the property in which
the security interest is taken and/or, in some instances, upon the nature of the trans-
action in which the security interest arises.
For the purposes of the Secured Transactions Article, property is classified either
as one of a variety of intangibles or as "goods." 70 And a security interest 7' in any
such property which has not been perfected as required by the Code is subordinate
to the interest of, among others, a creditor who acquires a lien on the property
involved "by attachment, levy or the like" without knowledge of the security interest
and before it is perfected.7" Under paragraph (2) of the new Section 6o of the
Bankruptcy Act, a transfer of property other than real property-and the Code does
not deal with real property-need no longer be perfected against bona fide purchasers,
but it must be perfected against a "lien ...obtainable by legal or equitable pro-
ceedings on a simple contract." This lien is further defined in paragraph (4) of
Section 6oa to mean a judgment lien or a lien of attachment, garnishment, exe-
cution, or like process. 73 This definition seems broad enough to encompass the
"s The House and the Senate Committee reports both list three "objectives" of the amendment to §6o
which are taken directly from a statement submitted in House Committee hearings by the American
Bar Association:
"(A) To retain unimpaired the basic object of the 1938 amendment, which eliminated the 'relation
back' doctrine of Sexton v. Kessler and the 'pocket lien' doctrine of Carey v. Donohue. . . . [See text
accompanying notes zi and 14, supra.]
"(B) To eliminate the evil of allowing a trustee in bankruptcy to take the position of a potential and
artificial bona fide purchaser, and to restore him to the position of a lien creditor, in harmony with his
functions under the Bankruptcy Act; and
"(C) In effectuation of said policy, to provide that no transfer made in good faith, for a new present
consideration, shall constitute a preference to the extent of such consideration actually advanced, if the
provisions of applicable State law governing the perfection of such transfer are complied with, with an
appropriately rigid time limitation (21 days) for such perfection if such limitation is not itself prescribed
by the applicable State law." H. R. REP. No. 1293, 81st Cong., rst Sess. 6 (1949); SEN. REP. No. 72, 8Ist
Cong., rst Sess. 3 (949).
"UNIFORIN COMMERCIAL CODE, PROPOSED FiNAL DRAFT (Text and Comments Edition, Spring
195o), as revised September, 1950.
'0 "Goods" are defined in §9-105(f) to include "all things which are movable at the time the
security interest attaches except money, documents of title, instruments, accounts, chattel paper, contract
rights and other things in action."
"In the Spring, 1950, edition of the Code, §9-Io5(h) of the Secured Transaction Article provides:
"'Security interest' means an interest in property taken or retained by contract to secure payment or other
performance of an obligation." The September, 195o, revision of the Secured Transactions Article omits
this definition, but I am advised that it is to be included in the general definitions of Article i.
"§9-301.
The last sentence of paragraph (4) adequately disposes of the threat of judicial liens with special
statutory priority.
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sort of lien creditor contemplated by the draftsmen of the Code, so that any security
interest which is not perfected as required by the Code will not be treated as
perfected in bankruptcy. And one of the few matters which are perfectly clear under
the new Section 6o is that in bankruptcy there need not actually be such a lien-
holder-vulnerability to a hypothetical lienholder is enough. Codifying a proposi-
tion which was never in doubt under the perfection clause of the Chandler Act,
paragraph (3) of Section 6D provides that the perfection clause shall apply "whether
or not there are or were creditors who might have obtained such liens."
What seems clear so far may become slightly cloudy upon a reading of para-
graph (5) of Section 6o, which provides that the new perfection clause does not
include liens which otherwise fit the description contained in Section 6o if such
liens will prevail over prior transfers only after the doing of some act which requires
"the agreement or concurrence of any third party" or "any further judicial action,
or ruling." If the perfection clause, in its application to personal property, still spoke
in terms of vulnerability to subsequent purchasers, this paragraph would be compre-
hensible as a measure to overrule the Vardaman decision, and at one stage in the
Congressional hearings Professor MacLachlan so explained it.74 But Vardaman had
been twice overruled already-once by the adoption of state statutes eliminating the
"Massachusetts rule" on which it was based, and again by removal of the bona fide
purchaser test from the perfection clause in paragraph (2) of Section 6o. Paragraph
(5) is, therefore, unnecessary for that purpose. At different stages in the Congres-
sional hearings, however, Professor MacLachlan and others explained that para-
graph (5) was added because he had found four cases "in which the holder of a lien
by legal proceedings can better his position by actions subsequent to acquiring his
lien."'75 Two of these cases are from Tennessee,76 and they indicate that the lien of
execution levy on land "may be lost, as against an intermediate innocent purchaser,
by failure to file the papers ... for [a judicial order of] condemnation in a reason-
able time," and that "the proceedings of condemnation became a Us pendens from
the date of such filing" as against one who buys the property after the condemna-
tion papers are filed. Since the perfection clause of Section 6o deals only with the
effectiveness of an execution lien on personal property as against a prior transfer, the
relevance of these cases is not apparent. The third case is from Kentucky,77 and
reveals that under a statute of that state an execution lien on realty is not good as
"After reading to the Committee from H. R. 2691 the language which is now paragraph (5) of §6o,
Professor MacLachlan said: "In other words, the Vardaman case is not going to be followed under 2691.
The Vardaman case said that if the hypothetical purchaser could get a payment, or hypothetically get a
novation, or hypothetically ride with any of the 'four horsemen' under section 173 of the Restatement
of Contracts . . . then he could prevail, and therefore the trustee in bankruptcy could prevail .... (T]o
allow the rights of the trustee to depend upon what some hypothetical person could hypothetically do
after he has acquired his desired status is fantastic, and that is what has aroused the business world, and
that is why you have had all of this hullabaloo for amendment of section 6o." 1949 Hearings, supra
note 45, at 54.
16 949 Hearings, supra, at 46; 1948 Hearings, supra note 45, at 19, 49.
"rMann v. Roberts, 79 Tenn. 57 (1883); Hammock v. Qualls, 139 Tenn. 388 (1917).
"' Donocher v. Tafferty, 147 Ky. 337 (1912).
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against a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer unless a statutory notice of the
execution is filed in the office of the court clerk. Even if this statute applied to
personal property, which it does not, and even if the filing of the notice had anything
to do with the lienholder's rights as against a prior transfer, which it does not, para-
graph (5) of Section 6o would not exclude this lien from the operation of paragraph
(2), since it does not exclude liens which are made to prevail over prior transfers by
the lienholder following "any step wholly within the control of the lien holder...,
with or without the aid of ministerial action by public officials." The fourth case is
a New York ruling 8 that all judgments which are propertly docketed against a
debtor at the time he acquires realty become liens of equal rank on the realty
acquired, regardless of the order of docketing or of the order in which executions
were issued and levied. What this case has to do with paragraph (5) of Section 6o
I cannot imagine. Nor can I imagine any other case where paragraph (5) will
affect the application of the perfection clause in paragraph (2) to transfers of per-
sonal property.
Thus far, then, it seems reasonably certain that any sort of security interest in
personalty not perfected as required in the Commercial Code, and hence subordinate
to the interest of a subsequent lien creditor, will be vulnerable to the bankruptcy
trustee's attack under Section 6o. But there is more to the new Section 6o, and its
additional provisions must be considered in the light of the Code's requirements for
perfection of security interests.
These requirements vary with the nature of the property involved. A security
interest in instruments79 or documents 0 can be perfected "only by the lender taking
possession of the collateral,"'" and is perfected only from the time possession is
taken,82 except that it is perfected for twenty-one days from the time it attaches8 3
without possession in the lender if it arises "by reason of an agreement signed by the
debtor under which the lender makes an advance, releases a perfected security in-
terest or incurs a new obligation." At the end of the twenty-one day period the
security interest "becomes unperfected . . .unless . . .the collateral has come into
possession of the lender."8' 4 The scheme of the Code seems clear. The holder of a
s Hulbert v. Hulbert, 216 N. Y. 430 (1916).
o "Instrument" is defined in §9-105(f) to include negotiable instruments, securities of the sort covered
by the Article on Investment Securities, "or any other writing which evidences a right to the payment of
money and which is of a type whose transfer customarily requires delivery. 'Instrument' does not include
chattel paper," as to which see note 86 infra.
"Presumably this means "documents of title," which are defined in §1-20(54) to include bills
of lading, dock warrants, dock receipts, warehouse receipts and "any other document which in the current
course of business or financing is treated as adequately evidencing that the person in possession of it is
entitled to receive, hold and dispose of the document and the goods it covers. To be a document of
title a document must purport to be issued by or addressed to a bailee and purport to cover identified
goods in the bailee's possession."
81 §9-303(3)-
82 §9-305(1).
""A security interest cannot attach until an agreement is made that it attach and value is given
and the debtor has an interest in the collateral. It attaches as soon as all of the events in the preceding
sentence have taken place unless explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching." §9-203.
" §9-304(I) (a).
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security interest in instruments or documents not arising out of the specified type of
signed agreement can perfect his interest against lien creditors only by taking im-
mediate possession; if the taking of possession is delayed, perfection will not "relate
back" to cut off intervening liens. But the security holder whose interest does arise
out of the proper sort of signed agreement is treated more favorably. He has twenty-
one days within which to take possession and perfect his security interest against
intervening and subsequent lienholders. This differentiation will not be observed
in bankruptcy, if paragraph (7) of Section 6o means what it seems to say.
That paragraph was born out of fears that the perfection clause of Section 6o as it
previously read would be construed to invalidate any transfer for a contemporaneous
loan not perfected at the very instant the loan was made. It would avoid this hazard
by giving the lender twenty-one days to perfect his interest in all cases save those
where state law specifies a "stated period of time" which is not more than twenty-one
days. If the lender does perfect his interest within twenty-one days, or within
the shorter period specified by state law, his transfer "shall be deemed to be made
... at the time of the transfer." Under subparagraph I(A) of paragraph (7) the
twenty-one day period specified by the Code for perfecting security interests in
instruments or documents arising out of the proper sort of signed agreement will
be observed, since "the applicable law specifies a stated period of time of not more
than twenty-one days after the transfer within which ... delivery .. . is required."
But the holder of a security interest in instruments or documents not arising out of
the specified type of signed agreement, who can perfect his interest against lien
creditors under the Code only by taking immediate possession of the collateral, will
also have twenty-one days to perfect his interest against the bankruptcy trustee. Sub-
paragraph I(B) of paragraph (7) specifies such a twenty-one day perfection period to
apply wherever "the applicable law specifies no such stated period of time or where
such stated period of time is more than twenty-one days." And here "the applicable
law [the Code] specifies no ... stated period of time." Moreover, if the holder of
the security interest does perfect his interest within twenty-one days, the perfection
will, under Section 6o, "relate back"--the transfer will be "deemed to be made ...
at the time of the transfer."
A security interest in goods85 or chattel paper 8 may also be perfected under the
Code by delivery of possession to the lender, and is so perfected only from the time
possession is taken, 7 except that where the interest in chattel paper arises out of a
signed agreement under which the lender makes an advance, releases a perfected
security interest or incurs a new obligation the lender again, as in the case of instru-
ments or documents, has twenty-one days within which to take possession 8  Here
, See note 70, supra.
* "Chattel paper" is defined in §9 -105(b) as "a writing of a type whose transfer in ordinary course
of business requires delivery and which evidences a security interest in or lease of goods. If the writing
is of a type whose transfer in ordinary course of business does not customarily require delivery, the right
is an account or contract right," as to which see note 89, infra.
67 §9-305(l).
8§9.3o4(I ) (a).
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again, paragraph (7) of Section 6o would obliterate the distinction made by the
Code. It would give all lenders twenty-one days within which to take possession and
would "relate back" the perfection in all cases to the time of the original transfer.
An alternative method of perfection for security interests in goods or chattel
paper, and the exclusive method of perfection for security interests in accounts and
contract rights 9 is the filing of a financing statement containing the names and
addresses of the debtor and the lender and a statement that the lender has or intends
to acquire a security interest in described collateral. 0 If the statement is filed before
the security interest attaches, the interest is perfected from the time it attaches; other-
wise the interest is perfected from the date of filing. 1 To this policy of promptness
in filing, there is one exception. A security interest in chattel paper arising under
a signed agreemnent under which the lender makes an advance, releases a perfected
security or incurs a new obligation is perfected from the time it attaches if filing is
accomplished within twenty-one days from the time it attaches.?2  Here again, para-
graph (7) of Section 6o would in all cases allow the lender twenty-one days to file,
with "relation back" to the original date of transfer.
The Code also contains exceptions which relieve certain sorts of security interests
of any perfection requirement. Two of these exceptions relate to purchase money
security interests" in certain kinds of goods. Neither possession in the lender nor
filing is required to perfect such a security interest in farm equipment94 having a
purchase price not in excess of $25oo, unless the equipment is a fixture or a licensed
motor vehicle," nor in consumer goods,96 unless they are fixtures or licensed motor
vehicles 7 Since Section 6o of the Bankruptcy Act imposes no perfection require-
ments of its own [see paragraph (8)], such security interests should survive in bank-
ruptcy without any perfecting action.
The Code would change the law of many states as to assignments, not only of
accounts receivable, but also of chattel paper and other contract rights. In this one
"g " 'Account' means a right to payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered which is
not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper. Any right to payment not yet earned by performance
is a 'contract right' but a right to wages, salary or other compensation of an employee or a right repre-
sented by a judgment or an instrument is neither a 'contract right' nor an 'account.'" §9-io6.
§§9-302, 9-403.
9§9.303(l).
9§9.304(0 ) (b).
"A security [interest] is a 'purchase money security interest' to the extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives value to enable
the debtor to acquire the collateral if such value is in fact so used; or
(c) taken by a person who for the purpose of enabling the debtor to pay for or acquire rights in
collateral makes advances or incurs an obligation not more that ten days before or after the
debtor receives the collateral even though the value given is not in fact used to pay the price."
§9-107.
' "Goods are. . 'equipment' if they are used primarily in business (including farming. .. ) ..
Equipment does not include goods which at the time a security interest attaches are being held or pre-
pared for sale or to be furnished under a contract of service." §9-ro9(3).
* 9-302(c).
o "Goods are . . 'consumer goods' if they are used for personal, family or household purposes."
§9-"09(1).
" §9.302(d).
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respect, the Secured Transactions Article goes beyond the field of security transactions
and covers transfers either as security or by way of sale.08 "Validation" and book-
marking statutes for assignments of accounts, and the "New York," "Massachusetts,"
and "English" rules for other assignments are to be replaced by the Code's general
requirement that all assignments be perfected by a form of notice-filing similar to that
now required by statute in fifteen states for assignments of accounts receivable. 9
Until so filed, the assignment would not be perfected against a lien creditor' 00 and
hence would be subject to attack under Section 6o, although here again paragraph
(7) of Section 6o would in all cases award a twenty-one day filing period with
"relation back." But here again there are exceptions. Neither filing nor delivery
of possession is necessary to perfect a further assignment by an assignee who
"finances accounts, chattel paper or contract rights in the ordinary course of his
business,"'' nor an assignment "which either is not for the purpose of financing or
does not alone or in conjunction with other assignments to the same assignee transfer
a significant part of the outstanding accounts, chattel paper or contract rights of the
assignor. '  The Official Comment on the Code informs us that the assignments
exempted "are the isolated assignment and the further assignment by a financing
agency" and these two exceptions are understandable enough. But what of the third
exception specified in the Code but not mentioned in the Comment-the assignment
which "is not for the purpose of financing"? Excluding the isolated assignment,
which is covered separately, when is an assignment as security or by way of sale not
"for the purpose of financing"? Perhaps an assignment of bad debts to a collection
agency is an assignment for the purpose of salvage rather than for the purpose of
financing, and perhaps it would be considered indelicate to treat an assignment of a
doctor's or lawyer's accounts as an assignment for the purpose of financing, but
beyond that I cannot go. Here again, however, any transaction which can be
brought within the Code's exceptions should survive in bankruptcy although no
perfecting action has been taken.
In addition to the exceptions which allow a twenty-one day delay in delivery or
filing for security interests in instruments, documents, and chattel paper, and the
exceptions which relieve assignments and certain types of purchase money security
interests of any perfection requirement, the Code contains another exception which
gives protection to all purchase money security interests against some, but not all,
third parties even though required perfection is delayed. If the lender files such an
98 59-1o2.
"In the case of chattel paper, if the assignment is for security, it could, in the altcrnative, be per-
fected by delivery of possession of the paper to the assignee. §9-3o3(b).
.00 Except for assignments of chattel paper for security where the security interest arises out of a
signed agreement under which the lender makes an advance, releases a perfected security interest or incurs
a new obligation. In such cases, the Code allows twenty-one days for perfection, either by delivery of
possession or by filing. §9-304(5)(a)(b).
'01 §9- 3 o2(f).
""2 §9-302(C).
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interest before or within ten days after he "gave value,"' 3 his interest will prevail
over an intervening transferee in bulk or lien creditor who becomes such between
the time the security interest attached and the time of filing. But his interest will not
prevail over an intervening secured lender10 4 who becomes such without knowledge
of the earlier interest and is first to perfect, nor will it prevail over a buyer "even
though not a buyer in ordinary course of business" to the extent that the buyer re-
ceives delivery of the collateral before he receives knowledge of the security interest
and before it is perfected.' °5
If there were no more to Section 6o than has so far been considered here, the fact
that the purchase money security interest is good against an intervening lien creditor
would be enough to protect it against the bankruptcy trustee. But Section 6o also
contains paragraph (6), which states a policy against, and prescribes a test to enable
the trustee to avoid, "equitable liens." Under this paragraph,
If a transfer is for security and if (A) applicable law requires a signed and delivered
writing, or a delivery of possession, or a filing or recording, or other like overt action as a
condition of its validity against third persons other than a buyer in ordinary course of
trade claiming through or under the transferor and (B) such overt action has not been
taken, and (C) such transfer results in the acquisition of only an equitable lien, then such
transfer is not perfected within the meaning of paragraph (2). Notwithstanding the
first sentence of paragraph (2), it shall not suffice to perfect a transfer which creates an
equitable lien such as is described in the first sentence of paragraph (6) that [the parties]
... take action sufficient to effect a transfer as against liens by legal or equitable proceed-
ings on a simple contract.
This departure from the lien creditor test was drafted by Professor MacLachlan
as an addition to the 1948 version of the Bankruptcy Conference bill after complaint
was made that the lien creditor test would restore "the equitable lien, a most un-
settling and vicious type of secret lien."'0 Professor MacLachlan, in the course of
explaining the reason for the addition, adverted to Sexton v. Kessfer'0 7 as typifying
the "trouble prior to the Chandler Act," and added:
In most jurisdictions, if a party has a valid equitable lien, no creditor obtaining by
legal or equitable proceedings a lien on such property could acquire any rights in the
property superior to the rights of the transferee. Therefore, the door is open through
H. R. 272 to undoing the fruits of the Chandler Act. All the secured creditor with his
secret lien has to do is to persuade the court to call it an equitable lien and he can pre-
vail over the trustee, if the trustee is deprived of his right to require the transfer to be
103 "Value" is defined in §9-xo8 as "satisfaction of or . . . security for a pre-existing claim" or "any
consideration sufficient to support a simple contract."
"'In the terminology of the Code, a "secured lender" is a person having a "security interest," which
is created by contract, as distinguished from a "lien creditor" who acquires "a lien . . . by attachment,
levy or the like." §§9-105(h), 9-301(3).
1CC §9-301(2).
108 Statement of Jacob I. Weinstein, 1948 Hearings, supra note 45, at 66. See also Oglebay, Proposed
Revision of 'Section 6oa of the Bankruptcy Act: Step Backwara, 21 J. N. A. REF. BANKM. 54, 58-59
(1947); Moore and Tone, Proposed Bankruptcy Amendments: Improvement or Retrogression?, 577 YALE
L. J. 683, 697 (3948), reprinted in 1948 Hearings, supra, at 36o-183; Comment, 57 YALE L. J. 828,
837-840 (1948).
107 See text accompanying note 14, supra.
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perfected against bona fide purchasers. . . At first it seemed an unavoidable evil, by
reason of the difficulties of drafting a provision to invalidate equitable liens without
preserving the bona fide purchaser test of the Chandler Act. We now believe the
difficulties of drafting have been mastered .... 108
Does the interest which the Code gives to a purchase money lender who delays
filing for ten days fall within the prohibition of paragraph (6) ? Clearly, it fits two
of the specifications contained in that paragraph. It is a transfer for security (A)
for which the Code requires either delivery or filing "as a condition to its validity
against third persons other than a buyer in ordinary course of trade" and (B) action
sufficient to perfect it against all such persons has not been taken. But does it fit
the third specification-is it "only an equitable lien"? What is an equitable lien"?
Is the term confined to those "judge-made" liens which cannot be classified as com-
mon law possessory liens? Does it include consensual liens which a statute, like the
Code in this instance, gives some but not full protection against third persons even
though not accompanied by possession or filing? Does it extend to liens created
by statute "the enforcement of which often comes within the equity jurisdiction" ?o0
Or, in view of the draftsman's concern with "secret liens," should the term be
construed to apply to all "security interests based neither on possession nor on
public record"?11° As Mr. Justice Erie remarked nearly a century ago, "the words
'equitable lien' are intensely undefined,"'' and the draftsman of paragraph (6) of
Section 6o was content to leave them that way. True, there is a reference in the
third sentence of the paragraph to "an equitable lien such as is described in the first
sentence" But the first sentence merely states a policy against "recognition of equi-
table liens where available means of perfecting legal liens have not been employed."
A description which merely sets the undefined "equitable lien" in juxtaposition with
a similarly undefined "legal lien" advances us nowhere.
I get no help on this problem from Professor MacLachlan's recent explanation of
the meaning of paragraph (6): "Where a delivery, a recording, or the like is required
by applicable law for the full validity of such a transfer against third persons other
than a buyer in the ordinary course of trade, claiming through or under the trans-
10o 1949 Hearings, supra note 45, at 47. The American Bar Association advised the House Committee
that one of the purposes of its bill was "to retain unimpaired the basic object of the z938 amendment,
which eliminated the 'relation back' doctrine of Sexton v. Kessler. " 948 Hearings, supra note 45,
at x8; 1949 Hearings, supra, at 139. And both the House and the Senate Committee borrowed this
quoted language in their reports to state one of the "objectives" of the x95o amendment. See note 68,
supra. Professor Hanna did not approve of this policy against equitable liens for three reasons: (x) Such
liens are not always "secret liens"-other creditors sometimes learn of them. (2) It is not the business
of Congress "to attempt to alter state rules of property and contract in order to enlarge the interests of
unsecured creditors." (3) "Since the bankruptcy court is a court of equity, the position of Congress in
announcing a policy determination hostile to equitable liens is somewhat anomalous." Hanna, Preferences
as Affected by Section 6oc and Section 67b of the Bankruptcy Lat, 25 VASH. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1950).
1004 PoMRoY, EQuITY JumsPtMuDEMc 784 (5th ed. 194). Liens "created or recognized" by
statute "in favor of employees, contractors, mechanics, landlords, or other classes of persons" are exempted
from §6o of the Bankruptcy Act by §67b.
1.0 Britton, Equitable Liens-A Tentative Analysis of the Problem, 8 N. C. L. REV. 388, 396 (930).
... Brunsdon v. Allard, 2 El. & El. 19, 27, 121 Eng. Rep. 8 (Q. B. 1859).
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feror, and where such overt action has not been taken, such a transfer is regarded as
not perfected, whether or not it gives rise to an 'equitable lien.' 112  He drafted the
paragraph and he should know what he meant to say, but I cannot imagine how
he disposes of the phrase, "and (C) such transfer results in the acquisition of only
an equitable lien," nor can I imagine how a court is to be persuaded to dispose of it.
About all that I can conclude, therefore, as to the fate in bankruptcy of a purchase
money security interest whose filing is delayed is that if the bankruptcy trustee can
persuade the court to call the interest as defined in the Code an equitable lien it will
be invalidated under paragraph (6) of Section 6o.113
Similar hazards under the "equitable lien" paragraph of Section 6o seem to
confront any sort of security interest under the Code in several other types of prop-
erty. Although such an interest in chattel paper can be perfected against lien
creditors either by delivery of possession or filing-and in some cases may be per-
fected for twenty-one days before either sort of action is taken" 4--a subsequent
assigneee for value who obtains delivery of the paper will prevail over an earlier
assignee if he obtains delivery before he has notice of the earlier assignment and
before the earlier interest was perfected by filing. And the subsequent assignee for
value will also prevail, even though the earlier interest has been perfected by filing,
if "the chattel paper has been created by the sale of inventory subject to a security
interest and if in the ordinary course of his business the assignee buys the chattel
paper or makes an advance on its security and . . . obtains delivery of the paper"
before he learns of the earlier interest." 5 Although a security interest in negotiable
instruments, investment securities, or negotiable documents can, in certain circum-
stances, be perfected against lien creditors for twenty-one days without delivery of
possession,'" a holder in due course of the instrument, a bona fide purchaser of the
investment security, or a "holder to whom a negotiable document has been duly
negotiated" will prevail over the earlier security interest.1 7  Although a secured
"' MacLachlan, Preference Redefined, 63 H~Auv. L. Rav. 1390, 1394 (1950).
""My colleague, Professor Donnelly, has pointed out to me that more obscure terminology in the
first proviso to paragraph (6) creates additional difficulty. According to that proviso, "where the
debtor's interest is only equitable, he can perfect a transfer thereof by any means appropriate fully
to transfer an interest of that character." Certainly, the debtor's interest as beneficiary of a trust is
"only equitable." Is his "equity of redemption" in property in which he has already given one security
interest also "only equitable"? However this question may be answered, what is meant by "any means
appropriate fully to transfer an interest of that character"? The context in which the proviso occurs
suggests that the reference is to any means sufficient to effect the transfer as between transferor and
transferee. If so, does this proviso mean that one who takes a security interest in property held in trust
for the debtor, or one who takes a second security interest in any property of the debtor, need take no
steps to perfect his interest against third parties? This result may be avoided by invoking the second
proviso of paragraph (6), which decrees that nothing in paragraph (6) shall be construed to be contrary
to paragraph (7)-and paragraph (7) provides that failure to comply with applicable law for perfecting
transfers of property for contemporaneous consideration against lien creditors will convert the transfer
into one for antecedent debt. But if the second proviso to paragraph (6) so limits the first proviso,
does the first proviso mean anything?
... See pp. 92-93, supra.
2 5§9-3o8.
126 See pp. 9o-92, supra.
117 §9-309.
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lender who has possession of negotiable instruments or documents, or investment
securities, or chattel paper may return such collateral to the debtor for a twenty-one
day period without risk of his security interest being subordinated to lien creditors,118
it will be subordinated to a second assignee for value of the chattel paper who obtains
delivery of the paper without notice of the prior interest,n1 or to a holder in due
course of the instrument or document or a bona fide purchaser of the investment
securities' 20  In all of these cases the secured lender, by failing to take or retain
possession of his collateral, has failed to take the action necessary to give his security
interest "full validity against third persons other than a buyer in the ordinary course
of trade" as required by paragraph (6) of Section 6o. If, therefore, a court either
concludes that his interest is "only an equitable lien" or agrees with Professor Mac-
Lachlan that no such conclusion is necessary, the security interest will be lost in
bankruptcy.
The Code also makes provision for security interests in property brought into
the state after the security interest was created. "The interest continues perfected for
a period of four months if already perfected under the law of the jurisdiction in
which it was last located. Thereafter the security interest continues perfected if
within the four-month period it is or becomes perfected under this Article." If
protection in the manner required by the Code is not accomplished within four
months, the security interest is subordinated to the interest of intervening lien
creditors.' 2 ' Is this not, then, a case where, in the language of paragraph (7) of
Section 6o, "applicable law requires a transfer ... for or on account of a new and
contemporaneous consideration to be perfected by recording, delivery, or otherwise,
in order that no lien described in paragraph (2) could become superior to the rights
of the transferee therein"? If it is, then it is also a case within subparagraph I(B) of
paragraph (7) where the applicable law specifies a "stated period of time [which]
is more than twenty-one days" after the transfer, in which event perfection must be
accomplished within twenty-one days after the transfer or the transfer will be treated
as one made for an antecedent debt. Obviously, this is to require the impossible in
any case where the property involved is removed to another state or the secured
lender learns of the removal more than twenty-one days after the security interest
was created. It may be a sufficient answer to this interpretation of paragraph (7)
to argue that its draftsmen obviously did not intend to require the impossible, but
secured lenders cannot rest confidently on this assumption. The judges who decided
the Vardaman' and Harvey' cases were not influenced by such arguments.
In view of the complicated intricacies of Section 6o in its present form, its appli-
cation to security transactions, whether they are governed by the Secured Trans-
actions Article of the Commercial Code or by existing laws which the Code would
... §9.304(2). 5x 9.308"
120 §9.309
.  
,2 §9-103(2).
2' Note 23 supra. " Note 62 supra.
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replace,124 may lead to other less foreseeable and perhaps more amazing results in
bankruptcy than have been indicated here. But enough has been indicated to
demonstrate the necessity for correlating revision either of the Code or of Section 6D
of the Bankruptcy Act. And it is extremely unlikely that Congressional Committees
which have labored for three sessions to produce the 195o amendment to Section 6o
will be very receptive to immediate proposals for further amendment. Hence, as
the draftsmen of the Code realize,"" the burden of accommodation now falls upon
them.
The time for such correlation, of course, was before enactment of the amendment
to Section 6o--both the amendment and the Code have been in process since 1945-
but apparently no serious effort in that direction was ever made. Professor MacLach-
Ian tells us that in drafting the "equitable lien" provision of paragraph (6) of Section
6o late in 1948 or early in 1949, "it was thought advisable to consult with the drafts-
men of the Proposed Commercial Code" and that "Professor Llewellyn made help-
ful suggestions, but expressed fear that such a provision might act harshly upon
small businessmen acting without legal advice."' 26 Without attempting to match
that masterful understatement, I venture to suggest that businessmen of all sizes,
with or without legal advice, may encounter some difficulty in attempting to ac-
commodate their credit practices to a number of the new provisions of Section 6o of
the Bankruptcy Act.
' Although this paper is confined to an analysis of the application of §6o to transactions covered
by the Code, results similar to those pointed out here will ensue under existing laws. For instance, §8
of the Pennsylvania chattel mortgage law [PA. STAT. ANN. §940.8 (Supp. X949)], which provides that
the mortgage constitutes a lien good against third parties "when filed," embodies a very different policy
than does §8 of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, which provides that the entruster's security interest
is valid against all creditors if he files notice of it within thirty days after delivery of the property to,
the debtor. But under paragraph (7) of §6o the secured lender will in both instances have twenty-one
days to perfect his interest against the bankruptcy trustee. Again, under §9 of the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act, even though the entruster files notice within thirty days, his interest in negotiable instru-
ments and documents will be subordinated to a bona fide purchaser and his interest in goods will be
subordinated to any bona fide purchaser, other than a transferee in bulk, who gives value and obtains
delivery of the goods before filing. Hence, the trust receipt transaction may be in jeopardy under the
"equitable lien" provision of paragraph (6) of §6o. For other instances of confusion resulting from the-
application of new §6o to security transactions, under existing state law, see Coblens, Assignment of
Accounts Receivable as Security-The Situation in Oregon, 29 ORa. L. REV. 214 (1950).
"'
5 See TRANSCRIPT OF DIscussIom' OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, JOINT MEETING, THE AMERI-
CAN LAw INsnTuTE AND THE NATioNAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 232:
(May, 195o).1
"
8MacLachlan, Preference Redefined, 63 HARv. L. Rev. 1390, 1393 n. 12 (1950).
